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Legalization Under the Premises of
Globalization: Why and Where to Enforce
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes
ANNA BECKERS*
ABSTRACT

This contribution advances the argument that global self-regulation
through corporatesocial responsibility codes can and should be enforced
under domestic private laws. Corporate social responsibility codes are
defined as unilateral corporate commitments that indicate a
corporation's willingness to take on a global regulatory role in the
absence of a global politicalgovernment-a phenomenon that is difficult
to grasp from the perspective of traditionalprivate law categories. The
contribution thus starts by discussing the aspects in which private
corporatecodes and private law categories seem not to fit, and points to
recent developments in substantive private law that could change this
situation, namely case law, statutory reform, and the novel contract
designs used by private actors to effectuate their corporate social
responsibility codes, which private law can rely upon. This contribution
argues that these developments provide sufficient ground to assume a
gradually evolving readiness within substantive private law to provide
for the enforcement of these corporate social responsibility codes.
Subsequently, the contribution focuses on the normative side of the
argument. From a socio-legal perspective, the main reason in favor of
enforcement is identified in the specific social potential and the risks
created through these corporatecodes for a globalized society that private
law has to help mitigate. Based on this argument, the contribution
continues by discussing the possible actors that could realize
enforcement. First, it identifies domestic courts as important actors to
enforce this type of global self-regulation, and, in this context, analyzes
how, in order for domestic courts to pursue such an enforcement strategy
on the basis of substantive private law, private internationallaw equally
requires a transformation. Second, the contribution considers
internationalarbitraltribunals as additional institutions that could be
entrusted with the enforcement if related changes in domestic arbitration
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laws can safeguard the function of domestic courts to monitor this
enforcement role of arbitrators.
I. INTRODUCTION: BRINGING DOMESTIC LAW BACK INTO THE CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE

Should domestic law, with its capability to enforce private
agreements and declarations, be used in relation to global private
regulation? More specifically, should private law be a means to enforce
domestically the commitments that corporations make in the area of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) for their worldwide operations,
thus subjecting noncompliance by companies, with their own
commitments rules, to legal sanctions?
These are the core questions discussed in this issue, and, in this
context, this particular contribution aims to provide a starting point for
the debate by presenting and specifying the argument in favor of a
stronger enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes through
domestic private laws. However, at the same time, this contribution
seeks to identify some of the obstacles that such a project faces. To be
more precise, it is emphasized that substantive private law is prepared
for, and should make use of, possible unilateral private regulation in the
area of corporate social responsibility as a binding obligation under
substantive private law. In this respect, my research shows that private
law is conceptually ready and should normatively pursue the
enforcement of private regulation.' However, in addition to presenting
my findings, I aim to analyze the specific character of corporate social
responsibility codes as global private regulation. This specific character
requires not only substantive private law but also private international
law to be able to support such a legal enforcement, by providing the link
between the global and the domestic spheres. Making use of the work of
scholars investigating the relation between private international law
and global governance, I argue that this area of law, with its strong
assignment of governance authority to private actors through the
concept of party autonomy, is not yet sufficiently prepared to take over
* Assistant Professor of Private Law and Legal Methodology, Maastricht University.
This paper was written during a postdoctoral Max Weber Fellowship at the European
University Institute Florence. I would like to thank Gunther Teubner, Hans Micklitz, Jan
Smits, Jan Eijsbouts, Larry Backer and Mark Kawakami for helpful comments. The
editors of the IJGLS are thanked for their excellent work in the review and publication
process. All remaining errors and misunderstandings are of course my responsibility
alone.
1. See generally ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAw (2015) (arguing that

corporate social responsibility codes should be enforced).
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the function of linking global private regulation and national private
law. 2 Hence, some ideas are presented in this contribution on how this
area of law needs to undergo a quite profound transformation in order to
be able to truly link global private regulation and domestic private law.
This contribution is structured as follows. To begin with, I discuss
the first part of the argument, namely, the doctrinal possibility and
normative desirability of legal enforcement of this type of global selfregulation through substantive private law (Section II). Based on this
affirmative position in favor of private law enforcement of private
regulation, the second part looks more in-depth at the question of the
forum in which to realize legal enforcement under the premises of
globalization, where the appropriate domestic context for enforcement
against companies remains heavily disputed (Section III). Here, I
suggest envisaging the previously identified enforcement on the basis of
substantive private law as a twofold development that focuses primarily
on domestic courts as the center for enforcement on the basis of national
private law, but also considers arbitral tribunals as possible centers for
enforcement. I discuss arbitration as a relevant forum of enforcement
because commercial parties, in particular, regularly enforce the legal
obligations in their contractual relations in these private institutions.
However, accepting arbitral tribunals as instances of enforcement
requires further control through domestic courts in their domestic
arbitration laws. To that end, I pay attention to the possibilities within
other legal areas related to private law to realize this twofold
enforcement strategy.
II. WHY SHOULD WE ENFORCE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CODES?

Can, and should, the system of private law play a role in the
enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes? The evolving
academic debate appears to be divided on this topic. There are scholars
who seem to be in favor of legal enforcement but, at the same time,
emphasize that the current possibilities within the system of private

2. For a project analyzing the links between private international law and global
governance, see generally Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the
Schism, 2 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 347, 354-55 (2011) [hereinafter Muir Watt, Beyond
the Schism] (discussing how the focus on private power in private international law has
impacted upon the global economy and the need for it to change in order to deal with the
challenges of globalization); Horatia Muir Watt, Conflicts of Laws Unbounded: The Case
for a Legal-PluralistRevival, 7 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 1 (2016) [hereinafter Muir
Watt, Conflicts of Laws Unbounded] (arguing that private international law has to
undergo a profound overhaul to address the challenges of globalization).
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law are rather limited. Such a skeptical tone reveals itself in the
description of enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes
against lead firms as "a matter of speculation," 3 a "utopian future," 4 or
with an emphasis on the corporate strategies of "avoiding liability."5
Others, in contrast, see the possibilities of enforcing corporate social
responsibility codes, but ask, in tones of uncertainty, whether such legal
enforcement is desirable or whether it will ultimately lead to a decline
or disappearance of self-regulation in the field of corporate social
responsibility.6 On the other side of the spectrum, we also find voices
emphasizing the inherent flexibility of the law and thus cautiously
observe that there are possibilities to the enforcement of private selfregulation in the field of CSR.7 Finally, there are those who more or less
openly sympathize with the prospect of a stronger interaction between
the state and global rules on corporate social responsibility.8
3. See Harry W. Arthurs, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Profit, Power and Law in the
Global Economy, in ETHICS
GLOBALIZATION 51, 59 (2005).

CODES,

CORPORATIONS

AND

THE

CHALLENGE

OF

4. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Consumer Law and the Environment: From Consumer to
Citizen, 21 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 45, 63 (1998); Thomas Wilhelmsson, A Green Sales Law?, 6
Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 83, 99 (2002).
5. LOUISE VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: ON CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODES OF CONDUCT, CONTRACTS AND (AVOIDING) LIABILITY 162

(2015); Cynthia Estlund, Enforcement of Private TransnationalLabor Regulation: A New
Frontier in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement? ("Perhaps needless to say, these codes were
drafted by lawyers, presumably with an eye to avoiding this sort of lawsuit."), in
ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL
WORLD 237, 254 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2012).

6. See, e.g., Joe Phillips & Suk-Jun Lim, Their Brothers'Keeper: Global Buyers and
the Legal Duty to Protect Suppliers'Employees, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 377-79 (2009); cf.
Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law:
The New Corporate Accountability ("Business is extremely adept at managing law to
circumvent and pre-empt legal control, through the art of 'creative compliance'."), in THE
NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9,

47 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007).
7. See generally MARTIN HERBERG, GLoBAISIERUNG UND PRIVATE SELBSIREGULIERUNG:
UMWEISCHUIZ IN MULTINATONALEN UNI'ERNEHMEN (2007) (using empirical material to

support the notion that corporate self-regulation is a form of law-making that can be
integrated into formal law in the interpretation of blank clauses and open-ended terms);
Carola Glinski, Bridging the Gap: The Legal PotentialofPrivate Regulation (detailing how
private law is prepared to legalize corporate self-regulation), in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS:
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 41 (Olaf Dilling

et al. eds., 2008).
8. This is particularly advocated on the ground of theoretical analyses. See Michael
Torrance, PersuasiveAuthority Beyond the State: A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational
CorporateSocial Responsibility Norms as Legal Reasons Within Positive Legal Systems, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1573, 1631 (2011) (applying Razian positivist theory and discourse theory to
argue that CSR standards should inform state legal systems); Gunther Teubner, The
Corporate Codes of Multinationals:Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance
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The same controversy seems to characterize the few court decisions
that exist on the topic. Some courts have ruled that the legal
enforcement of CSR codes is not possible, whereas other courts have
taken a more proactive position and considered them inherently binding
in order to regulate them on the ground of mandatory national labor
laws.9

Using this controversy as a starting point, I researched whether, on
the one hand, it is indeed possible to use the doctrinal system of the
law-in particular private law-for enforcement purposes and, on the
other hand, whether it is also desirable to make use of this possibility.
As a central outcome, I argue that both questions can be answered in
the affirmative.
A. Possibility
The argument in relation to the possibility of using private law for
enforcement purposes is built on two characteristics of corporate codes
where the possibility of enforcement remains in dispute: the
enforcement of unilateral self-commitments by companies and the
appropriate categorization of their regulatory character. The following
section seeks to reveal, first, in which way these two characteristics of
the codes show a lack of fit with substantive private law categories.
Second, it identifies recent developments initiated through case law and
statutory reform, which I argue can be relied upon to enforce corporate
social responsibility codes.

and Co-Determintion, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND
BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION 203, 210-11

(Rainer Nickel ed., 2010) (applying the perspective of legal pluralism to argue that an
interaction between corporate codes and state law is a condition for success of the codes).
See ANDREAS ROHMKoRF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL

SUPPLY CHAINS 202-12 (2015), for a more legal-doctrinal perspective.
9. With a view to contract law, see Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th
Cir. 2009), for a case against enforcement. See Landesarbeitsgerichte Disseldorf [LAG]
[Higher Labor Courts] Nov. 14, 2005, reported in 2006 NZA-RR [New Journal of Labor
Law - Law Reports] 81, for a case in favor of enforcement and regulation. For a
comparison of these two different approaches, see Katherine E. Kenny, Code or Conduct:
Whether Wal-Mart's Code of Conduct Creates a Contractual Obligation Between Wal-Mart
and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 453, 463-67 (2007).
See also, for the relevance of comparative law to these opposing decisions, Anna Beckers,
Doe v Wal-Mart Stores: Zur Praxis einer Rechtsoergleichenden Soziologischen
Jurisprudenz (analyzing Doe v. Wal-Mart from a comparative perspective on the basis of
U.S. and German law), in DIE FALLE DER GESELLSCHAFT: PRAXIS DER SOZIOLOGISCHEN

JURISPRUDENZ (Bertram Lomfeld ed., 2016), 195 and Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes
in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their Enforcement Depends Upon the Difference
Between ProductionRegimes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81 (2017).
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1. CorporateCodes and the Lack of Fit of PrivateLaw Categories
Firstly, enforcing corporate social responsibility codes on the basis of
substantive private law is difficult whenever the enforcement of a
unilateral promise, as opposed to a bilateral agreement on compliance
with a code of conduct, is at stake. The core reason is the strong focus in
private law on the enforcement of bargained or reciprocal obligations
that finds its expression in the common law doctrine of consideration
and the widely shared skepticism in several civil law systems over
enforcing unilateral promises without further formal requirements. I
have arrived at this conclusion on the grounds of the specifics of English
and German private law,10 but this observation is shared in similar
research investigating this constellation under other national legal
systems." Moreover, the focus can also be shifted from specific national
laws to international laws and principles on private law, for instance
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) principles or the Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), to observe that it is the legal character of unilateral selfcommitments that remains in dispute. 12
Secondly, I have identified that the system of private law seems not
to be truly prepared to enforce corporate social responsibility codes in
light of their specific character as private regulatory undertakings. The
lack of fit is particularly apparent when we seek to define the content of
the duties that derive from corporate codes as commitments to regulate
and to specify the remedies for those being regulated. Its reason is an
understanding in private law that legal obligations, be they created
through unilateral declarations addressed to consumers or contracts
with suppliers, have a bilateral character. This finds its technical
expression in the contract doctrine of privity.13 As a result, the corporate
code incorporated in a supplier contract, or addressed to consumers for
marketing purposes, is hardly capable of establishing rights for those
who should benefit from it, that is, communities or individuals affected
10. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 81.
11. For a view on U.S. law in general, see Phillips & Lim, supra note 6, at 373; for a
view on English law, see RVHMKORF, supra note 8, at 196.
12. For UNIDROIT Principles with further references, see Katerina Peterkova
Mitkidis, Sustainability Clauses in International Supply Chain Contracts: Regulation,
Enforceability and Effects of Ethical Requirements, NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 13-15 (2014). For
information detailing the relationship between CISG and contract references, see
Christina Ramberg, Emotional Non-Conformity in the International Sale of Goods,
Particularly in Relation to CSR-Policies and Codes of Conduct, in BOUNDARIES AND
INTERSECTIONS: 5TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE 71, 78-80 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2014).
13. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 129-41; RCHMKORF, supra note 8, at 196-97.
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by conduct that the corporate social responsibility code seeks to protect.
If the phrasing and context would, in any way, allow us to consider
these groups sufficiently specified and thus third party beneficiaries
that are legally entitled to enforce the corporate codes, we are still
inclined to argue with the fact that such an interpretation would lead to
an unforeseeable risk for the obliged contracting parties. On top of that,
contracting parties are free to exclude such third-party rights by
incorporating disclaimers, which can be seen in corporate social
responsibility codes. 14
Moreover, another obstacle relates to the underlying ideal typical
distinction within the law between different types of obligations. In
substantive private law, the rules applicable to the sale and the service
contract differ and, besides, there is a tendency within traditional
private law to provide rules for the sales transaction and to ignore longterm service contracts.15 As a result, the focus on the enforcement of
global self-regulation in the field of corporate social responsibility has in
the past primarily sought to regulate the transnational production
standards and long-term "services to society" that corporate codes
account for by means of indirectly relying on sales and product
regulation.1 6 While this indirect regulation, in principle, opens up

14. For examples of the use of disclaimers in corporate social responsibility codes and
its legal effects, see Phillips & Lim, supra note 6, at 362-63, 374-77 (analyzing CSR codes
under U.S. private law and the use of disclaimers as a way to prevent a legal obligation);
RtHMKORF, supra note 8, at 102-07 (analysing CSR codes under English private law and
to expressly declare the intention to not confer rights upon third parties as an obstacle to
enforcement).
15. See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Internal Versus the External Dimension of European
Private Law - A Conceptual Design and A Research Agenda, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EU 9 (Marise Cremona & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2016). For
a similar problem in international economic law with a view to the product/production
distinction, see Olaf Dilling, Proactive Compliance? Repercussions of National Product
Regulation in Standards of TransnationalBusiness Networks, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS:
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS, supra note 7,
at 89, 89-93.
16. See, e.g., Ingeborg Schwenzer & Benjamin Leisinger, Ethical Values and
International Sales Contracts (analyzing contractually incorporated codes of conduct
under the CISG as part of the product delivery obligation), in COMMERCIAL LAW
CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: JAN HELLNER IN MEMORIUM 249, 261 (Ross Cranston
et al. eds., 2007); Olaf Dilling, Die Produktionsbedingungals Produkteigenschaft - Ein
Fallbeispielfir die Haftung bei Werbung mit ethischen Produktionsstandardsnach der
Schuldrechtsreform (analyzing codes of conduct as part of the product specifications under
German sales law), in DIE UMWELTVERANTWORTUNG MULTINATIONALER UNTERNEHMEN:
SELBSTSTEUERUNG UND RECHT BEI AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN 283, 283-313 (Gerd Winter

ed., 2005); Hugh Collins, Conformity of Goods, the Network Society, and the Ethical
Consumer, 22 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 619, 634-38 (2014) (analyzing codes of conduct as part of
the product expectations under European consumer law).
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options for enforcement through sales law and international product
standards, such an approach does not fit with the reality of corporate
social responsibility codes. These global corporate social responsibility
codes are regulatory undertakings that replace or supplement public
regulation and in which the objective is mainly to restore compliance
rather than safeguard the success of a particular transaction and the
health and safety aspects of a product.1 7

The practical problem of indirectly grasping this regulatory
character of the codes with the help of sales law becomes apparent, on
the one hand, when attempting to define the actual obligation under
private law that a party incurs through a corporate code. Is it an
obligation to deliver an "ethical product" or an obligation to engage in
mitigation of socially adverse effects of the production? Is it, moreover,
an obligation to produce a result or rather an obligation to undertake
best efforts? 1

On the other hand, the problem is replicated in the discussion on
the remedial system in contract law, which can be applied to
noncompliance with CSR codes.' 9 Again, the contract law rules
applicable to sales transactions are organized to safeguard their
successful completion. They should allow the innocent contracting party
to enforce his right to have the contract performed successfully by
claiming damages for a product with the wrong specifications, seeking
specific performance in the form of product delivery, or terminating the
contract in the case that mutual trust is irreparably damaged.
Conversely, it is not immediately clear how these can be effective
remedies for the constellation of private regulatory failure, which is the
case when companies do not comply with their corporate social
responsibility codes. 20
2. Recent Developments: Toward the Capabilityof Private Law to
Enforce CSR Codes
In spite of this seeming lack of fit of existing private law categories
with the reality of corporate codes, there are recent developments
within legal doctrine that could allow for the enforcement of unilateral
self-commitments as well as for private forms of regulation. As I argue,
17. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial
Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1557, 1596-97 (2013), for an
understanding of product and process standards.
18. See Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory
Standardsin Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 93-96 (2014).
19. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 146-48, 220-21; RUHMKORF, supra note 8, at 201-02.
20. See Cafaggi, supra note 17, at 1614-16.
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this provides a sufficient degree of flexibility to begin relying on private
law for the enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes.
Although still requiring some change in private law doctrine to
accommodate the corporate codes, these developments are sufficiently
linked to the underlying principles of the respective doctrine to be
understood as an evolution rather than revolution or rupture of the law
as it stands, and thus safeguard the valid claim for maintaining the
integrity of legal doctrine. 21
In relation to unilateral promises, we can first refer to an important
statutory change in European private law that has come about with the
Consumer Sales Directive. According to Article 2(d), it is now possible to
enforce public declarations that traders use in marketing, insofar as
these characterize the product. Similar attempts have been discussed
with a view to commercial contracting under the Vienna Sales
Convention (CISG), in which Article 8 and Article 9 CISG could be used
as legal bases. 22 In the context of the United States, it is primarily
Section 90 of The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which has already
been tested with a view to the enforcement of corporate promises to
protect workers abroad. 23 Also, in other national legal systems, there
are rules that could provide for the enforcement of unilateral
undertakings. 24 Moreover, the protection of legitimate expectations and
venire contra factum proprium are important principles in international
trade that prohibit private actors from raising expectations by making a
25
declaration and simultaneously showing contradictory behavior. The
character of the corporate codes as promises that raise expectations in
the context of the market are almost a paradigmatic example of this
category. 26 Interestingly, we can find several, though less attentiongrabbing, cases in lower courts at a domestic level, in which such
contract principles were stretched to transform unilateral declarations

&

21. See GUNTHER TEUBNER & HUGH COLLINS, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS
19 (Hugh Collins ed., Michelle Everson trans., 2011) (emphasising the need for
maintaining the integrity of legal doctrine as a legal principle). But see Jan M. Smits,
Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private Law: On the Disciplining
Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99 (2017) (analyzing the extent to
which corporate social responsibility codes can be enforced against corporations and
taking a critical stance on the possibility of enforcement under current doctrine).
22. See Fabrizio Marrella, Human Rights, Arbitration, and Corporate Social
Responsibility in the Law of International Trade, in ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, 266, 302-03 (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 2007); Ramberg, supra note
12, at 78-81 (describing a skeptical approach to the views discussed); Schwenzer
Leisinger, supra note 16, at 263-64.
23. See Phillips & Lim, supra note 6, at 375-76.
24. See VYTOPIL, supra note 5, at 73-74 (providing a comparison to Dutch sources).
25. See Marrella, supra note 22, at 302.
26. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 266-69; Teubner, supranote 9.
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by businesses in the market context into binding obligations, if good
reasons, in particular the protection of consumer expectations, were so
suggested. 27 In addition, there also seems to be a tendency in tort law
toward using unilateral policy declarations as components in
establishing liability within corporate groups for violations of workplace
standards. 28
Similar observations can be made on the approach of private law in
relation to the regulatory character of corporate codes within private
law. There seems to be a tendency toward relaxing the requirements for
third-party rights in order to deal with the negative effects of contracts
on third parties. Even England-known for practicing a strict
understanding of contract privity-enacted the Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act 1999, which allows third parties to enforce a contract
term that is made in their benefit, even if this is a group and not an
individual. In order to apply this category to corporate codes, we must
take note of proposals that argue toward denying private actors to
exclude the application of the Act when a contract is evidently made for
the benefit of third parties. 29 As a result, third parties that according to
the company's intention should benefit from the corporate code could
enforce them as third-party beneficiaries.
When it comes to the problems associated with the remedial regime
applicable to noncompliance with a code of conduct, it is further
important to note that social pressure has already led companies to
develop sophisticated contract designs that contain a separation
between sales obligations and code of conduct provisions, and which
subject the latter to a specific remedial regime for restoring compliance
with the codes. These contractual remedies are detached from remedies
that ought to ensure the successful completion of a bilateral exchange.30
In other words, private actors seem to provide applicable rules
themselves in the absence of suitable dispositive rules in contract law.
Against this background, any private law enforcement in relation to
corporate codes could profit from these efforts by merely relying on the
already existing, inherently flexible rules on contract interpretation to
enforce what has been laid down in the corporate code and any contract
27. See Landgericht [LG] [regional courts] Berlin Apr. 2003, reported in 2003
Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM] 1895; LG Bremen, file number 2-0-408/05, judgment 16
June 2005 (discussing particular German cases).
28. See generally Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [2011] QB 951 (Eng.)
(showcasing English law on this topic).
29. See John N. Adams et al., Privity of Contracts - The Benefits and the Burdens of
Law Reform, 60 MOD. L. REV. 238, 242 (1997); RVHMKORF, supra note 8, at 211.
30. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
TransnationalRegulation, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499, 511-23 (2008); Cafaggi, supra
note 17, at 1611-16; Peterkova Mitkidis, supra note 12, at 20-22.
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in which it has been integrated. In this regard, the vague phrasing often
used in the codes (and equally often criticized, one may add) could be
interpreted in the light of their purpose, namely, by relying on the
national and international political frameworks that companies use as a
benchmark for their regulation and that are in some cases even
explicitly referred to in the contracts.31 It is thus the combination of a
specific contract design by the contracting parties and the existing,
already flexible rules on contract interpretation and supplementation
that I would see as a sufficiently flexible basis to provide for private law
enforcement. 32
B. Desirability
Having emphasized the potential within substantive private law to
enforce corporate social responsibility codes, I now turn to the difficult
and probably far more controversial side of my argument, which is that
33
The key to my
it is also desirable to rely on these possibilities.
argument lies in transcending the boundaries of the doctrinal system in
order to consider the potentials and risks of corporate self-regulation
and the related role of the legal system.

31. See Sarah Coleman, Enforcing International Framework Agreements in U.S.
Courts:A ContractAnalysis, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 601, 632 (2009) (describing a
view toward International Framework Agreements and stating that "[c]ourts can turn to
the LO's Conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of
Association to clarify the intent of the parties and the material terms of the contract");
ULRICH MVCKENBERGER, Ein Globales Hybridarbeitsrecht, in TRANSNATIONALES RECHT

457, 474ff (Gralf-Peter Calliess ed., 2014) (noting Miuckenberger's definition in the area of
labor standards as an evolving "hybrid labor law" under globalization); Pierre Thielborger
& Tobias Ackermann, A Treaty on Enforcing Human Rights Against Business: Closing the
Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop?, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 43 (2017) (describing
the similarities with respect to the UN Guiding Principles).
32. Cf. Anna Beckers, Using Contracts to Further Sustainability?:A Contract Law
Perspective on Sustainable Public Procurement (arguing that public authorities can use a
specific contract design to regulate sustainability requirements for private companies or
rely on the reform of private law), in SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT UNDER EU LAW:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE AS STAKEHOLDER 206 (Beate SjAiell & Anja Wiesbrock

eds., 2016).
33. See generally Larry Cat6 Backer, A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes Without the State? A Critique of Legalization Within the State Under
the Premises of Globalization, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD 115 (2017) (describing a
series of embedded behavioral controls attached to and in the realm of the state); Mark T.
Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out and Spills Over, 24
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147 (2017) (describing how threats of legal sanctions, or other
external incentives, can be detrimental to companies striving to be socially responsible,
analyzed from a behavioral standpoint).
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To start with, the analysis of corporate social responsibility codes
from a social theory perspective makes it possible to describe them as
instances that seek to provide for self-limitation of globally operating
enterprises to eventually mitigate their negative effects on society.34 In
that respect, they can be considered an important component in filling
the governance gap on an international level, that is, to contribute to
complementing the wide freedom that companies enjoy at a global level,
with respective obligations that prevent their negative externalities on
society. Here, an analysis of the content of the corporate codes shows
that they are by no means solely marketing campaigns without any
meaningful content. On the contrary, the message that they convey to
the public is a serious promise to mitigate the companies' negative
externalities on society.35 One may add, they are introduced by
companies in the context of the market, in which unilateral promises
are not simply altruistic promises, but have the clear objective of
receiving an advantage through attracting consumers and investors or
even convincing the government to refrain from regulatory intervention
because of the purported firm and honest self-regulation by the market.
To rely on this characteristic provides for a normative basis of the
enforcement.
Moreover, these corporate social responsibility codes lead to specific
social conflicts. From the perspective of the legal system-and that is
explicitly one of the core assumptions behind the argument in favor of
enforcement-there is a need to contribute to mitigating social risks of
new social phenomena. Relying on the work of socio-legal theory, such a
need arguably comes from an understanding of the legal system as the
"gentle civilizer
"mediating and

of social systems" 3 6 and of it needing to fulfill
co-ordinating functions in . . . complex conflict

constellations." 37 This need is also based on a less altruistic perception
of the legal system; taking its share in mitigating social risks in a global
society is a chance for the law to emphasize its importance within a

34. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSITUrTONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITTlONAISM AND
GLOBALIZATION 78-86 (Gareth Norbury trans., 2012); Gunther Teubner & Anna Beckers,
Expanding Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 523, 533-36 (2013).
35. See Martin Herberg, Global Legal Pluralism and Interlegality:Environmental SelfRegulation in Multinational Enterprises as Global Law-Making, in RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAw IN TRANSNATIONAL

ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS,

supra note 7, at 17, 25; BECKERS, supra note 1, at 233-65.
36. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1045
(2004).
37. See Christian Joerges, A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigmof the
PostnationalConstellation, in KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW
IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS 465, 475 (Josef Falke & Christian Joerges eds., 2011).
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global society and thus the dependence of society on it, which may
38
guarantee its survival on the premise of globalization.
But what are the social risks that this form of self-regulation brings
about and how can the legal system assist in that respect? In order to
answer these questions it is crucial to understand the specific character
of the corporate codes. Corporate codes lie at the intersection between
the public and the private. They have a peculiar character that relates
to their formal origin in an economic relation-in a self-commitment of
the company toward consumers, in a private contract between
companies and their customers or suppliers-and their substantive
content, which refers to compliance with broader societal interests, that
is, respect for human rights, improvement of workplace standards, the
39
prevention of corruption, or the protection of the natural environment.
They are, to borrow the expression of another scholar, a "no-man's land"
40
This Janus-faced
between the systems of politics and economy.
most vulnerable
their
as
well
as
character is the codes' greatest strength
relation, they
economic
an
to
interests
point. By directly linking societal
system
political
the
avoids
which
open new ways of political regulation,
acting as a catalyst.
The development and publication of corporate codes does not require
a political debate on whether corporations should be subject to human
rights obligations and the related intense controversy in international
politics. Private parties, such as consumers, large-scale customers, or
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), can directly pressure
companies into adopting standards or improving them and, in that
respect, might be much quicker. 41 Companies may also perceive their
codes as favorable regulation because they are tailor-made to their
global and production-specific operations. Yet, the flexibility and
informality of private regulation remains at the same time its curse:
private self-regulation is dependent on private parties as the authors of
the standards as well as their commitment to truly serve as
38. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 490 (Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004)
(predicting that the legal system will eventually level out as a system in global society).
39. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 306.
40. See Poul F. Kjaer, The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational
Constitutionalism:A Sociological Perspective ("Such 'in-between' structures tend to act as
the no-man's-land in which different normative orders collide because different spheres of
meaning (Sinnwelten) are colliding."), in AFTER GLOBALISATION: NEW PATTERNS OF
CONFLICT AND THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION 285, 315 (Christian

Joerges & Ralli Tommi eds., 2011).
41. One of the examples in which such an informal private process seems to be quicker
is certainly the regulation for building safety after the Rana Plaza collapse, in which the
private agreement between global trade unions and companies was signed only a couple of
months after the building collapse. See Backer, supra note 33.

28

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:1

administrators and regulators of this form of regulation. This naturally
results in a risk that this private regulation in the public interest
becomes subordinate to economic motives. To be more concrete: how can
we ensure that companies, as the authors of this form of self-regulation,
practice their role as a political actor, and not subject their corporate
social responsibility practices to the pressures coming from within the
economy? One core problem is the economic rationale that companies
remain subject to when operating on a global scale, and that is likely to
result in the subordination of societal rationalities expressed in codes
under the economic imperative. 42
Against this background, corporate codes must remain extremely
fragile institutions that are constantly exposed to two opposing
rationalities. Such an inherent risk calls for an externalization of
private self-regulation that is directed toward, if not eliminating, at
least mitigating the economic bias. Teubner has described this as an
exogenous self-limitation in which the law has to play a crucial role. 43
To be sure, in this process the law will do more than simply stabilize
private self-regulation. The legal system can indeed lend legitimacy to
these new forms of global norm-production by transposing them into the
national legal system. 44 This, however, cannot be understood as a simple
incorporation and uncritical reflection of corporate social responsibility
codes; the interaction between corporate self-regulation and the law is
also a way by which the latter administers and regulates the former on
its own terms, thereby incidentally deciding on the extent to and the
conditions under which private regulation is accepted as legitimate
private regulation. If corporate self-regulation is to be considered a
production of corporate-specific norms on a global level that aims at
specifying societal obligations for businesses, then the legal system can
regulate this form by insisting on the public character of those
obligations and the necessary requirements for public legitimacy.
Translated into private law, this could amount to the use of contractual
third-party rights in order to allow those being affected by private
regulation to participate in the development of private regulation, or to
use the rules on interpreting contracts and declarations to complement
private regulatory activities-the regulatory contract or the public
42. See generally Emilios Christodoulidis, On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism,
20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (2013) (arguing from a theoretical perspective that the
political system under globalization is inherently in danger of market capture). For an
empirical focus and focus on individual managers, see Dean A. Shepherd et al., "I Care
About Nature, but..." Disengaging Values in Assessing Opportunities That Cause Harm,
56 AcAD. MGMT. J. 1251 (2013) (showing on the basis of interviews that corporate
managers tend to ignore environmental values in constellations of strong competition).
43. See TEUBNER, supra note 34, at 107; Teubner & Beckers, supra note 34, at 536-39.
44. See Micklitz, supra note 15, at 14.
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promise to regulate-with general principles of good administration and
governance.45

III. WHERE CAN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES BE
ENFORCED?
Having made this claim in favor of enforcement, I seek to turn to the
second part of my inquiry of where the envisaged development within
national private law doctrine toward enforcement could and should
ultimately be initiated. To add an inquiry to that end is arguably
necessary given that the identification of a basis for legal enforcement
does not automatically result in its realization. The demand for enforced
globalized private regulation always requires an additional look into
who is called upon to deal with this difficult task of initiating the
suggested changes in the law.
A. The Domestic and the Global: Toward Two Forums of Enforcement
In line with the other contributions, it is clear there is a difficulty in
institutionalizing enforcement at a global level through an existing
international court. Instead, we need to focus on the existing forums for
enforcement. 46 On that basis, there are arguably two significant forums
in which the enforcement can be realized in the long term. Firstly, it is
indeed courts that can develop the law further when deciding disputes
47
because courts stand at the center of the legal system. Hence, this
contribution advocates an approach that focuses on national courts as
core institutions in which the acceptance of global regulatory processes
needs to be debated and decided. 48 Yet, it is equally recognized that, in

&

45. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 364 (building upon the research on global
administrative law). See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as
Administration-Nationaland TransnationalApproaches to Global Administrative Law,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005) (developing the concept of global administrative law
descriptively, doctrinally, and analytically).
46. See Anna Beckers & Mark Kawakami, Why Domestic Enforcement of Private
Regulation Is (Not) the Answer: Making and Questioning the Case of Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 3-4 (2017); Thielborger
Ackermann, supra note 31.
47. See LUHMANN, supra note 38, at 274-304.
48. For similar approaches taken by scholars of global administrative law, see Benedict
Kingsbury, Weighing Global Regulatory Rules and Decisions in National Courts, ACTA
JURIDICA, no. 1, 2009, at 90, 93-99, 117-18 (2009). See also Eyal Benvenisti & George W.
Downs, National Courts and TransnationalPrivate Regulation (focusing on the role of
national courts in the enforcement of transnational regulation and the doctrines these can
rely on), in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A

GLOBAL WORLD, supra note 5, at 131, 135.
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the area of private law, courts can only initiate such developments when
they are called upon to decide such a dispute. In fact, the insight that
dispute resolution between private actors nowadays takes place largely
in private arbitration forums also renders the evolution of law as a
matter of the practice of dispute resolution outside the court system.
This thus calls, secondly, for an analysis of arbitration as a facilitator of
or obstacle for enforcement. As I argue below, arbitral tribunals can be
valuable additional instances to administer global self-regulation, but it
is relevant to maintain the influence of the state legal system, in
particular national courts. State courts play a crucial role for the
acceptance or refusal of decisions taken outside of it as legally valid. 49
This claim for enforcement on both levels mirrors the understanding
that a long-term integration of corporate codes into the legal system can
only be successful if due respect is paid to the fragmentation of the legal
system under globalization. This requires recognizing the direct
national enforcement of global self-regulation (corporate social
responsibility codes) and the national enforcement of transnational law
in which global self-regulation is equally debated (arbitral tribunals
applying national laws or lex mercatoria of which CSR codes can be a
part).
Consequently, the following section envisages enforcement by
national courts as eventually consisting of two levels: by courts directly
and by courts insofar as they decide on the validity of transnational
dispute resolution as law. However, as I will emphasize, the legal areas
that are at the core of linking the global private regulatory sphere to the
domestic sphere of the state, that is, private international law including
arbitration laws, would have to undergo quite a profound
transformation. To outline the possibility and desirability of such
transformation in detail is a necessity of future research.

B. Enforcement in Domestic Courts and Private InternationalLaw
The most crucial forum to accommodate legal enforcement -of
transnational self-regulation is arguably judicial enforcement. As is
argued for in the literature on global administrative law, the specific
role that national courts can play is to serve as enhancers, but also
49. See LUHMANN, supra note 38, at 102 ('The unity of a conflict as an interaction
system, which involves persons or organizations, can provide the basis for the decision to
opt out of the legal system. However, the legal system even regulates this decision by
protecting its concerns. For instance, there is no way of avoiding participation of the legal
system altogether (we are enslaved to it); an agreement outside the courts also has to
satisfy certain legal requirements if it is to be valid.").
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gatekeepers, for private governance arrangements by measuring them
in the light of the criterion of "publicness," that is, their capability to
50
express a "matter of concern to the society as such." What follows from
this understanding is that national courts would have to use the
occasion of lawsuits brought by victims of corporate misconduct, or by
activists, to give legal doctrines new interpretations. One may think of
51
and Canada 52
the recently initiated lawsuits in the United States
against several retailers for alleged failures in the Bangladesh building
53
collapse or in Germany for the factory fire in Pakistan, and consider
them thus as occasions by which the enforcement of global selfregulation could be furthered.
Notwithstanding this option, this certainly requires considering the
courts' ability to actually address such enforcement questions in
substance. Such ability can by no means be taken as given as courts
dealing with cases involving CSR codes are, in the first place, faced with
an obstacle that results from the specific global character of this form of
private regulation. To be more precise, before being able to engage in a
thorough analysis of the binding character of corporate social
responsibility codes under existing private law doctrine at all, courts
have to link the global to the national. Technically speaking, this takes
54
the form of the private international law analysis. As others have
indicated, questions of private international law, in particular
jurisdiction and the choice of law questions, can indeed be an obstacle
for relying on private law to enforce private regulation, such as

50. Kingsbury, supra note 48, at 114, 117.
51. Class Action Complaint Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., filed, No. 15-cv-619, 2015 WL
1870867 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2015), Claim dismissed in Delaware Superior Court on 9 May
2016.
52. Class Action Complaint against Loblaw Companies, filed 22 April 2015.
53. Claim filed 13 March 2015 at Landgericht Dortmund, interim decision on legal aid
taken in favor of plaintiffs on 30 August 2016; cf. Peter Rott & Vibe Ulfbeck, Supply Chain
Liability of Multinational Corporations?, 23 EuR. REV. PRIV. LAW 415 (2015) (discussing
the possibilities of supply-chain liability of multinationals for violation of labour standards
also with reference to this case). See generally Paying the Price for Clothing Factory
Disasters in South Asia, EUR. CTR. CONST. & HUM. RTS., http/www.ecchr.eulen/ourwork
lbusiness-and-human-rights/working-anditions-in-south-asiapakistan-kik.html (last visited Dec.
19, 2016) (for information regarding this lawsuit that is provided by the advocacy group
assisting the victims).
54. See generally Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The
Regulatory Functionof PrivateInternationalLaw in an Era of Globalization,40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002) (analyzing private international law as the vehicle to provide
the regulatory link between the global and the domestic sphere).
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corporate social responsibility codes. 5 5 In the following paragraphs, I
focus on specifically some of the difficulties related to choice of law.
One core reason for choice of law questions to have become such an
obstacle is the evolution of this area of law as being based on freedom of
choice that private actors can rely on.5 6 If enforcement is based on
contract law, as the doctrinal categories suggested above indicate, the
court has to apply the law the parties have opted for. This could be the
home country of one of the parties,57 but it can also be the law of a third
country perceived to be business friendly. 5
In particular, the latter tendency may become an obstacle to the
effective enforcement of global private regulation. Private actors can
choose not only whether to engage in global self-regulation, but also
what laws to subject their self-regulatory practices to. This is considered
problematic because the emphasis on free choice in conflict of laws is
related to a quite remarkable change in the relation between party
autonomy and mandatory rules in private international law, as opposed
to national private law. In the domestic context, freedom of contract was
not granted in an unlimited way, but it remained subject to the
mandatory rules that safeguarded public interests.59 In conflict of laws,
however, the relation between private freedom of choice and regulation
by mandatory rules has shifted toward the former. Mandatory rules now
appear as limiting instances only if they can be understood as
overriding mandatory rules, that is, as being norms of such utmost
importance in the forum that they require application even when
parties have chosen the application of a foreign (to them more
beneficial) law. If we consider that parties also have some autonomy in

55. See Jacco Bomhoff & Anne Meuwese, The Meta-Regulation of Transnational
PrivateRegulation, 38 J. L. & SOC'Y 138, 149-50 (2011); VYTOPIL, supra note 5, at 43-60.
56. See Horatia Muir Watt, "PartyAutonomy" in International Contracts: From the
Makings of a Myth to the Requirements of Global Governance, 6 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 250,
253 (2010) (analyzing the way that private international law has enshrined freedom of
choice as the foundational principle and thereby created the parallel world of private
transnational ordering).
57. See Louise Vytopil, Contractual Control and Labour-Related CSR Norms in the
Supply Chain: Dutch Best Practices, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 155, 160 (2012) (for empirical
evidence in the Netherlands); ROHMKORF, supra note 8, at 84-85 (for empirical evidence in
England).
58. See Stefan Vogenauer, Oxford Civil Justice Survey: Summary of Results, OXFORD
14-16 (Oct. 1, 2008) httpJ/denning.aw.ox-ac-uk/iec/pd
rd%/2Civil%20OJusti%/2Survey%/20%2OSummary%200/20ResultsO/o2Finalpdf (summarizing the results of a study in which
England and Switzerland turned out to be preferred systems).
59. See MORITz RENNER, ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT: ZUR STRUKTUR DER
WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES 24-65 (2011) (analyzing the relation

between freedom of contract, dispositive and mandatory rules in substantive private law
and private international law).
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choosing the forum, and thereby influencing the domestic basis that will
serve to determine what rules have an overriding mandatory character,
private choice appears to trump even these few rules that remain
overriding. Hence, within choice of law rules, mandatory rules are
61
classified as having a "semi-mandatory"6 0 or "relatively mandatory"
status, as marginal remains in an area otherwise characterized by the
idea of freeing private actors from political influence.
For the topic of enforcing corporate social responsibility codes, this
shift is quite significant as it is also mandatory rules that form a
necessary component in the substantive private law enforcement
architecture. The argument of legally enforcing self-regulation rests on
the idea that private law is needed in order to go beyond merely making
legally binding the initial free choice made by private actors to selfregulate on a global scale. The law also needs to insist that the choice
for self-regulation can be allowed only if procedural and material
standards of acting as a regulator are fulfilled. 62 Mandatory rules are in
that respect of crucial importance to safeguard that global selfregulation is ultimately not used in a biased way, which suggests that
the possibility to opt out of this mandatory regulation of private self63
regulation against this background is quite problematic. If we consider
further the different levels of readiness of national legal systems to
provide for the enforcement

on the basis of mandatory rules,

64

it

becomes clear that the choice by the private regulators provides them
with the option of circumventing substantive enforcement by means of
the choice of law.
One could certainly conclude that private law enforcement requires
changing conflict of laws in order to limit the freedom of private actors
to choose the law governing their self-regulatory rules, in favor of a
stronger role for domestic mandatory rules, and initiate legal reform to
that extent. However, given the long legacy of party autonomy, at least

60. Muir Watt, supra note 56, at 259, 264-65.
61. See Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States:
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 419-21
(2008) (discussing the concept of "relatively mandatory rules" in the context of private
international law).
62. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 344-48, 350-51, 359-60 (developing the theory,
arguing for supplementary regulatory duties, and discussing the use of third party rights,
respectively).
63. See Horatia Muir Watt, The Relevance of Private InternationalLaw to the Global
Governance Debate, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

(Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernindez Arroyo eds., 2014).
64. See Teubner, supra note 9, at 94.
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within the conflicts of law dealing with contract disputes, 65 this must
remain a quite ambitious undertaking, or, as a learned observer puts it,
lead to a fundamental "overhauling of the concepts." 66 It is clear that
such a fundamental endeavor cannot be discussed in detail in this short
paper. Rather, it requires closer attention in future research. Therefore,
I merely seek to introduce first ideas through which the field could, in
the long run, be transformed to reflect more appropriately the reality of
transnational private regulation, in which free choice and mandatory
elements need to be interwoven. These ideas are based on the strand in
theoretical conflict of laws scholarship that argues for considerations of
non-state (legal) orders when determining the applicable law,6 7 and

those that indicate the need for its transformation in order to deal
appropriately with global governance.6 8 One could, taking this
understanding into account, advocate for the understanding of selfregulation through corporate codes as applicable rules to the dispute per
se resulting from the choice by the parties of a global private regulatory
regime. Yet, taking seriously this form of global self-regulation under
conflict of law rules would also need to result in an attitude of the courts
to apply, as an integral part of these global self-regulatory rules, the
evolving principles of good global governance.6 9
From a doctrinal perspective, there are at least two possibilities on
which such an interpretation could be based, although these are
admittedly a quite significant departure from the status quo. They will
65. For a historical account of choice of law for contracts with a view to Savigny, see
generally Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571 (1999) (analyzing historically the
convergence of private international law in the US and Western Europe towards choice of
law by the parties and discussing explanations for this convergence).
66. Muir Watt, Conflicts of Laws Unbounded, supra note 2, at 2. Compare the rather
critical stance toward a new regulatory approach to private international law taken by
Bonhoff& Meuwese, supra note 55, at 151-54.
67. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 36, at 1000, 1021; see also Gunther
Teubner & Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Transnational
Regimes in the Double Fragmentationof World Society (arguing that, under the functional
differentiation of society, new forms of private law making are evolving that, in conflicts of
law, would have to be recognized),

in REGIME-INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:

FACING FRAGMENTATION 23, 25 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012).
68. See generally Muir Watt, supra note 63; Muir Watt, Conflicts of Laws Unbounded,
supra note 2 (discussing the need to accommodate the changing nature of law under
globalization as described by legal theory within private international law and legal
scholarship and applying a critical approach to reveal its governance function).
69. See Muir Watt, supra note 56, at 282-83; Muir Watt, Beyond the Schism, supra
note 2, at 427 ("By taking the 'private' seriously, its participation [i.e. the participation of
private (international) law] in the politics of international law could ensure that interests
beyond the state-of which some require tethering while others strive for recognitionwork towards the planetary good.").
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be outlined here but require another occasion to be critically evaluated
in detail. Firstly, if we understand this form of global self-regulation as
genuine law, we could go so far as to understand the choice by
corporations to engage in global self-regulation as the directly applicable
law chosen by the parties, which includes principles of good global
governance as "global mandatory rules." An example to which such an
interpretation could be linked is Article 17 Rome II Regulation, which
provides courts in tort law disputes with the option of applying, in
addition to the applicable state law, "rules of safety and conduct which
were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the
liability."70 This could at least be an angle to be used if enforcement is
based on tort law. Yet, in the light of past skepticism directed at
allowing such a direct application of non-state orders as a contractual
choice of law, 71 this might turn out not to be an option in the case that
enforcement is based on contract. Therefore, one alternative that courts
could stick to, with at least a little more ease and without statutory
reform, is to consider the mandatory elements in corporate selfregulation indirectly. A court that is called upon to decide a dispute
could indirectly rule on their application by means of interpreting those
substantive private law rules as being of an overriding mandatory
nature, through which enforcement in the light of the regulatory
character is realized, provided this cannot be achieved by applying the
national law chosen by the parties. Pursuant to this suggestion, a court
would not treat non-state principles for global private regulators as
inherently mandatory rules of the company's choice to regulate; instead,
the private law rules would be treated to have mandatory character
insofar as they provide for these principles. More specifically, the rules
on contract interpretation will qualify as mandatory if they are used to
constitute the duties of private regulators, and the private law rules on
contractual third party rights as mandatory insofar as they safeguard
participation of and accountability to those parties that are regulated.

70. Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007, art. 17, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40.
Admittedly, this proposal requires a broad interpretation of the provision that treats both
state rules and private rules as rules on conduct "in force." Id.
71. See, e.g., Bomhoff & Meuwese, supra note 55, at 153 ("Orthodox European PIL ...
is heavily focused on dispute resolution through courts and on the binary allocation of
legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction among state legal orders. PIL, in addition, is
generally very uncertain or even defensive about admitting a role for non-state norms,
such as those of lex mercatoria or of religious legal systems."); cf. GRALF-PETER CALLIESS
ET AL., ROME REGULATIONS: COMMENTARY 85 (Gralf-Peter Calliess ed., 2d ed. 2015)
(providing a related, but unsuccesful, proposal in the legislative process of the Rome I
Regulation to include in Art. 3 the possibility of a choice of parties for "the prinicples and
rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community").
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C. Enforcement by Arbitral Tribunals and Domestic Control Through
ArbitrationLaws
Having argued for national courts as important institutions in the
enforcement process, I now turn to the fact that the majority of disputes
between private (commercial) parties is nowadays brought to
international arbitral tribunals rather than courts. 72 Consequently,
national courts may, at least in cases only involving commercial parties,
not be called upon to decide on global corporate social responsibility
codes. In that respect, the importance of this privatized dispute
resolution is multiplied by the fact that arbitral awards once issued are
generally enforced without in-depth court review. Although national
courts are in principle able to refuse to recognize an arbitral award,
they have, for several reasons,7 3 only in a limited way engaged in a true
review of the disputes decided by arbitral tribunals. Hence, any claim
for private law enforcement of global self-regulation needs to address
what role arbitral tribunals should have in this process. 74

&

72. See Jilrgen Basedow, EU Law in International Arbitration: Referrals to the
European Court of Justice, 32 J. INT'L ARB. 367, 381-82 (2015); Hermann Hoffmann
Andreas Maurer, Entstaatlichungder Justiz Empirische Belege zum Bedeutungsverlust
Staatlicher Gerichte fur Internationale Wirtschaftsstreitigkeiten[The Vanishing Trial in
German Commercial Courts: Empirical Evidence for the Decrease in Importance of
National Courts in International Trade Cases], 31 ZEITSCHRIVI' FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE
279 (2010) (providing empirical evidence from legal databases to underline the thesis that
the importance of state courts in commercial cases is decreasing); RENNER, supra note 59,
at 45-47.
73. See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, ¶ 2
(June 10, 1958), for a limited set of grounds for courts to refuse recognition and
enforcement that they can raise ex officio, namely the possibility of arbitration and public
policy. See JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SABASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 757, 902-03 (2d ed. 2007), for characteristics of arbitration
laws that prevent courts from reviewing the merits of domestic annulments or
enforcement procedures of awards. See Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), for an example of courts increasing the scope of disputes
that they consider arbitrable and subjecting them only to limited review. See Muir Watt,
supra note 55, at 268, for an example of courts being less inclined to initiate a
development toward a more thorough review of awards in order to remain an attractive
country for the arbitration industry.
74. See Roger P. Alford, ArbitratingHuman Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 517
(2008); Gregory R. Day, Private Solutions to Global Crises, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1079,
1082-83 (2015) (observing the trend within international private contracting to subject
human rights questions to arbitration); Ian H. Eliasoph, A Missing Link- International
Arbitration and the Ability of PrivateActors to Enforce Human Rights, 10 NEW ENG. J. OF
INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 83 (2004); Estlund, supra note 5, at 237 (discussing and criticizing
the legal enforcement of corporate codes of conduct as unfeasible and arguing for an
enforcement in alternative dispute resolution). See generally Marrella, supra note 22
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To be more precise on this point, arbitration becomes specifically
relevant for the enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes
whenever the legal basis for enforcement is the contract between
companies and suppliers or the public commitment of a company made
toward its suppliers. In this regard, it is, on the one hand, the innocent
contracting party that could pursue an enforcement strategy in case the
contract contains an arbitration agreement,75 but it is, on the other
hand, also conceivable that detrimentally affected parties could bring a
claim as third-party beneficiaries of the contract, including the
arbitration agreement.7 6 Hence, the main prerequisite for arbitral
tribunals to become instances of enforcement of corporate social
responsibility codes is the prior agreement between the parties to
arbitrate, either in the course of concluding the contract or in the
consensual submission of a dispute to arbitration. As to this condition, it
must suffice to emphasize that it is a common feature of international
commercial contracts to incorporate agreements to arbitrate and that,
moreover, it is also becoming more popular in agreements laying down
obligations for companies to improve labor standards.7 7 Consequently,
the mere possibility of entrusting arbitral tribunals with the
enforcement of global self-regulation seems as such not particularly
problematic to assume; and yet, in order to complete the argument
developed in this paper, there is a need to focus more in depth on why
78
private arbitrators should be entrusted with this possibility, and based
on the answer to that question, what role domestic courts should be
given.
(discussing human rights as a new challenge for international business transaction and its
relevance in arbitration).
75. For example, companies could enforce contractually incorporated contracts against
their suppliers and suppliers could enforce the contractual duty to cooperate against their
buyers.
76. See Alford, supra note 74, at 540-48. See generally James M. Hosking, The Third
Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: Doing
Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 469 (2004) (analyzing the
option of third parties to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
agreement).
77. See Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh at 11 5, BANGLADESH
ACCORD (May 15, 2013), http//bangladeshaae iorgdqp-content/upioadsf2l3/10/theanrd.pdf for a
prominent and publicly available example of an international agreement between trade
unions and companies. See also Day, supra note 74, at 1102-03 (for more examples).
78. It must suffice to indicate here that if the question were answered in the negative,
there are existing rules that could be used to prevent arbitrators from dealing with
enforcement issues. The main option would then be to consider business and human rights
disputes as nonarbitrable. This would mean that courts called upon by victims were under
no duty to stay proceedings or to refer parties to arbitration and could annul the award (in
the country of the seat) or refuse recognition and enforcement of an award (in any other
country).
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Naturally, the proposal as to the enforcement within a global
privatized dispute resolution forum seems quite counterintuitive, or
even contradictory, against the background of what has been stated
above. As much as global self-regulation comes into being through
private choice, arbitral tribunals are evidently institutions of dispute
resolution that receive their power through a private contract and thus
serve primarily the needs of the parties. Why should such a privatized
institution be called upon to enforce self-regulation that seeks to limit
business activities in the interests of society?
A quite apparent and "easy" argument would be to refer to the
several practical advantages of arbitration that could also work in the
interest of those affected by human rights abuses. After all, aspects such
as speed, confidentiality,
informality, and almost worldwide
enforceability that businesses value much in arbitration may be equally
beneficial for victims seeking to obtain compensation or to obtain a
binding ruling on a company's noncompliance with its own selfcommitments. This is particularly relevant to the extent that access to
courts for victims remains limited. Yet, in light of the assumptions I
have made above, my argument will have to go deeper and provide an
account of why arbitral tribunals are also important as forums in which
the legal enforcement is furthered and institutionalized in the interest
of society (and not only as having practical advantages for victims in
providing them with an additional forum). In that respect, I place the
emphasis on the expectation that arbitral tribunals can, firstly, and
similar to courts, further the enforcement on the basis of the national
private law, insofar as it is applicable to the merits of the case.79
Besides, and even more importantly, arbitral tribunals can take into
account trade usages and customs and thus assist in relating corporate
social responsibility codes and enforcing them as part of the public
80
policy elements of the lex mercatoria.
In that regard, one can refer to
empirical and theoretical research that has provided evidence for the
fact that arbitration practice suggests a tendency toward an increasing
reliance on public interests in their decision-making. As this research
79. In this context, I can add that arbitral tribunals might even be the more suitable
instances to enforce corporate social responsibility codes. They enjoy a considerably higher
degree of flexibility in determining the law applicable to the merits of the disputes and
may therefore more easily overcome rigid private international laws as discussed above.
See International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, Art. 21 (2012) (allowing the
tribunal to apply the law the tribunal "determines to be appropriate" in the absence of an
expressed choice by the parties).
80. Cf. Hugh Colins, Flipping Wreck Lex Mercatoria on the Shoals of Ius Cogens
(observing with a view to the financial lex mercatoria), in CONTRACT GOVERNANCE:
DIMENSIONS IN LAW AND INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 383 (Stefan Grundmann et al.

eds., 2015).
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suggests, arbitral tribunals appear to transcend their perceived focus on
the choice and interests of commercial parties by referring within their
decisions to elements of a transnational public policy. 81
Notwithstanding this option, a closer look at this research seems
equally to reveal that the-so far--core elements of this transnational
public policy remain very issue-specific. They focus on aspects relevant
to upholding a competitive market that are crucial for commercial
parties to operate, such as the prevention of corruption, the application
82
of rules of competition law, and the protection of commercial agents.
Other social interests, in particular human rights considerations or ius
83
cogens norms, seem less present in this practice. How can hope be
placed in arbitral tribunals to enforce corporate codes against the
interest of the business community if these very tribunals remain
"privatized justice" that consider primarily those public policies that are
relevant for commercial actors to operate and not primarily those in the
interests of society? Or, vice versa, can the enforcement of selfregulation in the interest of society and their integration into
international trade and customs be successful at all if arbitral tribunals
begin to deviate from the (private) interests that are the reason for their
existence and begin to rule in the interest of diametrically affected
parties? 84
It is indeed quite questionable whether arbitral tribunals are
inclined to initiate such a process autonomously. On the contrary, it will
81. Moritz Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in TransnationalLaw?, 26 J. INT'L
ARB. 533, 542 (2009); Moritz Renner, Private Justice, Public Policy: The
Constitutionalization of International Commercial Arbitration (describing the
development of constitutionalization within arbitration through increasing reference
within arbitral awards to a transnational order public), in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 117, 130 (Walter Mattli

& Thomas Dietz eds., 2014).
82. This becomes apparent when looking at what examples are used when referring to
the evolving public policy in arbitral practice. Cf. Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms
in TransnationalLaw?, supra note 80, at 539-43; Renner, Private Justice, Public Policy:
The Constitutionalizationof InternationalCommercial Arbitration, supra note 80, at 12534 (Walter Mattli & Thomas Dietz eds., 2014); RENNER, supra note 58, at 123-24
(concluding that in ICC-arbitration three core legal areas appear as mandatory rules: anticorruption, competition law and the law on commercial agents).
83. See Renner, Towards a Hierarchy of Norms in TransnationalLaw?, supra note 81,
at 542.
84. See Renner, Private Justice, Public Policy: The Constitutionalization of
International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 81, at 139 ("As arbitral dispute
resolution gains both in doctrinal consistency and in responsiveness to political concerns,
it loses in flexibility and adaptability to the parties' concerns. Private gains which are
usually expected from arbitration vis-A-vis domestic court proceedings might thus be
cancelled out. As a result, economic actors may prefer to settle their conflicts by more
informal means from the outset.").
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arguably require the exercise of pressure on these very tribunals to
initiate such a development, and this is exactly where domestic law and
courts can come into play, this time in their role as those having a
"second look" at arbitral awards on corporate codes. One option to
pressure arbitral tribunals into adopting a more favorable enforcement
attitude could be for courts to develop an attitude toward refusing
recognition or enforcement on the grounds of a nonconsideration of the
public elements that are expressed in corporate self-regulation. This
could trigger arbitrators to pay respect to this in future proceedings, as
despite being a privatized system of dispute resolution, arbitration as an
institution requires constant recognition and support, in particular
when parties seek to actually enforce the awards. If neglecting public
interests could lead to nonrecognition, the effectiveness of arbitral
tribunals could be diminished precisely because the worldwide
enforcement is one of the considerations behind choosing arbitration.
Moreover, the decisions by domestic courts on enforcement are equally
not to be neglected by the arbitrators, since arbitrators are under a duty
to consider the enforceability of the award.8 5
To provide an inquiry into the possibilities within existing
arbitration laws for such a development would go beyond the scope of
this paper and require a deeper discussion on different arbitration laws
and how they are applied in practice. However, as at least some initial
supporting case law for the proposal to monitor the role of arbitral
tribunals in enforcing corporate social responsibility codes, one can refer
to the constellation of competition law. For this area, the U.S. Supreme
Court as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union have ruled
that arbitrators can be entrusted with competition law questions and
have, at the same time, insisted on a retrospective review in the
enforcement of arbitral awards.86 One could argue that this line of
reasoning could be equally applied to other fields including labor law,
environmental protection, or human rights law and the related
enforcement of corporate self-regulation in these areas.8 7 However, it is
equally true that this would require a quite profound transformation
within arbitration laws, which currently view the public policy exception

85. See International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, Art. 41 (2012) ("In
all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal
shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award
is enforceable at law.").
86. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055.
87. See George A. Bermann, Navigating EU Law and the Law of International
Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT'L 397, 418-19 (2012).
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as a ground for nonenforcement very narrowly, and generally prevent
88
courts from reviewing the merits of the case.
Apart from a change in the approach taken by national courts in the
enforcement stage to make arbitrators consider corporate social
responsibility codes, there is a second option that might become a
promising step toward safeguarding the enforcement of global corporate
social responsibility codes through arbitral tribunals. As is currently
debated at an international level, such cases could be brought to a
special tribunal set up to deal with business and human rights disputes,
89
which includes disputes over corporate self-regulation. However, while
such a proposal could be promising, there are many aspects in which the
interests of the business community and those of society in effective
human rights protection seem again to be difficult to reconcile. This
reveals itself in questions on the law that the tribunal has to apply, that
is, private law or international human rights law, the specifics of the
procedure, such as confidentiality, and also whether parties would
actually opt for such a mechanism if their interests were not sufficiently
considered.9 0
For the time being, it seems therefore more promising to focus on
domestic courts as those that ultimately apply laws in the public
interest, either directly when called upon to enforce global corporate
social responsibility codes or indirectly in monitoring the decisions made
by private arbitral tribunals. To achieve this in the boundaries of
private international law and arbitration laws is already a sufficiently
challenging proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION

This contribution has sought to provide the terrain for the debate in
this issue on whether, and if so, how enforcing corporate social
responsibility codes can and should be realized. To that end, the first
part was devoted to developing the argument in favor of enforcing
corporate social responsibility codes from a doctrinal and theoretical
perspective. Subsequently, I sought to turn the attention to the forum in
88. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 72; POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 72; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at
614 (1985).
89. Claes Cronstedt & Robert C. Thompson, A Proposal for an International
Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights, 57 HARV. INT. L.J. 66 (2016).
90. See Donald Earl Childress III, Is an InternationalArbitral Tribunal the Answer to
the Challenges of Litigating TransnationalHuman Rights Cases in a Post-Kiobel World?,
19 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 31, 45-46 (2015); Juan Pablo Calder6n-Meza, Arbitration
for Human Rights: Seeking Civil Redress for CorporateAcrocity Crimes, 57 HARV. INT. L.J.,
60, 63-64 (2016).
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which the enforcement of this form of global self-regulation should be
initiated and what related challenges the domestic enforcement of
corporate social responsibility codes faces. The core idea in this part is
that enforcement would have to be based on a twofold strategy. On the
one hand, the argument for enforcement relies on courts as institutions
to integrate global self-regulation into the national system of private
law. This requires quite significant transformations within the system
of conflict of laws in order to be able to apply the rules on which
enforcement can be based. On the other hand, as arbitral tribunals are
accepted as preferred instances of dispute resolution by commercial
parties, it is recognized that they could equally become a forum for
enforcement, but if, and only if, domestic courts are simultaneously
granted a true second look to ensure that the public interest norms
relevant for the enforcement have been respected by the arbitrators.
Finally, it needs to be equally clear that the suggested twodimensional enforcement strategy will not put an end to the debate on
whether and how to enforce global self-regulation, and it will certainly
give rise to new problems. The existence and desirability of a hierarchy
between the different forms of enforcement, and the anticipated
conflicts between different instances furthering the enforcement, seems
to be only one of the main aspects that require further debate.

